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In their new book The Enigma of Reason Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber 
try to solve the philosophical problem made explicit in the book’s title. The 
enigma, as Mercier and Sperber see it, is in the following: humans are ani-
mals, but there is certainly something that separates them from the rest 
of the animal kingdom. The differentia specifi ca for humans is our ability 
(capacity) to reason. Now the question arises how well do we reason. Most 
experimental evidence, from the Four card problem (Wason selection task) 
to the Linda problem (a form of the conjunction fallacy), points to the con-
clusion that we reason poorly. If reasoning is our evolutionary superpower, 
as Mercier and Sperber’s note, then it is very hard to see why we are en-
dowed with a fl awed superpower. Why is it that we are so bad at something 
that is, presumably, our evolutionary advantage? And how has something 
we are so bad at evolved in the fi rst place? These two questions sum up the 
enigma from the book’s title.1
Firstly, we shall look at the structure and methodology of the book in 
question. We shall see how the chapters and subchapters are structured 
and how Mercier and Sperber’s argumentation emerges form that struc-
ture. Also, we are going to examine their writing style and how it impacts 
their argumentation. Secondly, we are going to evaluate the main argu-
mentative line of the book. We shall see on which basis does their argumen-
tation stand and how do they defend it with specifi c arguments. Thirdly, 
we need to recognize possible problems regarding the book and fi nally give 
a closing remark.
The Enigma of Reason has fi ve major chapters (excluding the Introduc-
tion and the Conclusion): Shaking dogma, Understanding inference, Re-
thinking reason, What reason can and cannot do and Reason in the wild. 
The chapters follow each other exceptionally well. Mercier and Sperber 
start with identifying the problem (Shaking dogma) then they transition 
into building up the ground fl oor for their argumentation (Understanding 
inference) after which they build up their case (Rethinking reason, What 
reason can and cannot) and in the end they try to preventively react to pos-
sible criticism (Reason in the wild).
The writing style is lighthearted and engaging and there can even be 
found humorous elements in the book. One of those moments is that in 
1 Mercier and Sperber are calling it “double enigma”.
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which the authors talk about how people use reasons to justify and explain 
their action to others. In this specifi c case, a man named Theodore Wafer 
has killed a victim of a car-crash, Renisha McBride, on his door step, be-
cause he mistakenly believed he was being attacked.2 In Mercier and Sper-
ber’s words:
Wafer, for instance, could, perhaps not with suffi cient good sense but not ab-
surdly either, see his reasons as objectively justifying his shooting the person at 
the door. Had he, on the other hand, given as his reason for having fi red a shot 
that Elvis Presley was dead and that therefore life was meaningless, we would 
see this not as a genuine reason-based explanation, not even a defective one, but 
as an admission (or a claim) of temporary insanity. (112)
Humorous excursions like this one can be found throughout the book. Other 
than entertaining the reader these excursions serve another purpose. They 
help the reader to transition more effi ciently from one dense line of argu-
mentation to another. On a macro level, the book is engaging and light-
hearted because of the way in which almost every major chapter begins, 
namely, with some kind of narrative exposition. Form Descartes’ internal 
struggles about Reason and doubt over Sherlock Holmes’ not so great de-
ductive powers to the tragedy of Alphonse Bertillon,3 these narrative ex-
positions serve as an introduction to a certain philosophical problem that 
Mercier and Sperber are trying to solve. That being said, it should be noted 
that the argumentation of the authors does not rely in any way on these 
expositions. Their argumentation is made on independent grounds.4
Mercier and Sperber’s argumentation is clear and precise. On top of 
that, they do not presume the reader’s prior knowledge about the philosoph-
ical problems that they are engaging with. The authors defi ne and explain 
every concept and theory that they discuss. This ranges from rudimentary 
concepts in logic (like antecedents and consequences) to the explanation of 
dual process theory. As a result, the reader can successfully follow a line of 
argumentation that goes from simple to complex.
Here is the content of The Enigma of Reason. In the fi rst place we need 
to establish what this book is about and then we will go deeper into the 
authors’ argumentation. In The Enigma of Reason Mercier and Sperber are 
trying to answer two questions:
 1. How do we reason?
 2. Why do we reason the way we do?
Now we need to position the subject at hand in a broader philosophical 
context. Mercier and Sperber are tackling with one of the core problems in 
philosophy today (even in the history of philosophy for that matter)—the 
nature of human reasoning. One does not venture on a journey like that 
overnight. The Enigma of Reason is a product of years of research, both em-
pirical and theoretical. Throughout the years the authors have been build-
ing up their arguments in papers like Why do humans reason? Arguments 
2 Mercier and Sperber use a real-life example here.
3 The real-life tragedy was actually about Captain Albert Dreyfus in what 
is historically known as “The Dreyfus Affair”, but the tragedy of reason is about 
Alphonse Bertillon.
4 What those grounds are shall be discussed later in this review.
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for an argumentative theory, Intuitive and refl ective inference and Epistemic 
vigilance.5 In that regard they certainly seem to be totally competent for the 
challenge at hand.
In the fi rst chapter, Shaking dogma, Mercier and Sperber try to identify 
the problem. Humans do engage in the act of reasoning but it seems we are 
extremely bad at it. In the history of philosophy there were two schools of 
thought on that matter. One school was trying desperately to argue that hu-
mans do in a way reason properly (to some extent at least), while the other 
gave up completely on the notion that humans can reason properly and 
concluded that we are irrational beings. Mercier and Sperber are formulat-
ing this historical exposition in the form of a trial (Reason on trial), which 
is very engaging and entertaining. The second part of Shaking dogma is 
dedicated to the contemporary analysis of human reasoning mostly based 
on empirical evidence. Here the authors argue that even contemporary the-
ories like dual process theory cannot explain how people reason in the light 
of evidence that comes from research in the psychology of reasoning. They 
conclude that we need a new approach to human reasoning.
In the second chapter, Understanding inference, Mercier and Sperber 
are setting up the stage. Throughout this chapter they are defi ning the 
relevant concepts and notions that they will use later in their argumenta-
tion. Firstly, they are differentiating between two concepts: inference and 
reasoning. Inference is an extraction of new information from information 
already available, whatever the process. Reasoning is the particular process 
of pursuing that goal by attending to reasons. As we can see, reasoning is 
just one form of inference. The main point being the emphasis on reasons, 
which will come in play later. Secondly, and arguably the most important 
defi nition in this book, is the defi nition of intuitions. Mercier and Sperber 
defi ne intuitions as judgments or decisions that are justifi ed without knowl-
edge of the reasons that justifi es them. That being said, Mercier and Sperber 
are also claiming that intuitions are a distinctive “metacognitive” category. 
An example that the authors provide is the following:
When you infer from your friend Molly’s facial expression that she is upset, you 
are more or less confi dent that you are right. Your own cognitive states are the 
object of a “metacognitive” evaluation, which may take the form either of a mere 
metacognitive feeling or, in some cases, of an articulated thought about your own 
thinking. (65–66)
Thirdly, the authors use the concept of modularity in order to explain how 
humans infer (on a mechanical level). The biological modules can be defi ned 
as autonomous mechanisms with a history, a function, and procedures ap-
propriate to this function. The concept of modularity (in this sense) was 
fi rst introduced by the philosopher Jerry Fodor in his book The Modularity 
of Mind. The authors are building up on that notion with the concept of 
massive modularity. Lastly, they defi ne metarepresentations. Metarepre-
sentations are representations about representations (higher order repre-
sentations). Mercier and Sperber argue that we rarely engage in this kind 
of thinking (except for philosophers who have a professional deformation of 
this kind). On the other hand, we do engage in one specifi c form of meta-
5 There are other papers and publications that have contributed to the creation of 
The Enigma of reason, but these are the most notable ones.
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representational thinking all the time. That form is called mindreading. 
Mindreading is a metarepresentational module that informs us about what 
others believe through our intuitions. A simple example by the authors is 
the following:
When the woman in the waiting room looks at her watch and sighs, you guess not 
only that she believes that the doctor is keeping her waiting but also that indeed 
the doctor is keeping her waiting. From this, you may draw further inferences of 
your own, such as about how well the doctor keeps her appointments. (103–104)
In the third chapter, Rethinking reason, Mercier and Sperber are argu-
ing their case. They begin with establishing what reasons are. According 
to them, reasons are social constructs. They are constructed by distorting 
and simplifying our understanding of mental states and of their causal role 
and by injecting into it a strong dose of normativity and they are primari-
ly for social consumption. Reasons themselves are inferred. How are they 
inferred? By intuitive inference. And how does intuitive inference works? 
Well, according to the authors, inferences are made possible by the exis-
tence of regularities in the world. For example, I can walk outside and see 
that the pavement is wet, but I certainly cannot see that the pavement be-
ing wet is a reason to believe that it has been raining. But what I can do is 
intuitively infer the reason in question. We are using reasons in two distinct 
forms: retrospectively and prospectively. When we use reasons retrospec-
tively we do it to justify and explain our actions or beliefs. When we use rea-
sons prospectively we do it for individual or communicative purposes. When 
we use reasons individually we are engaging in an act of inquiry and when 
we use reasons communicatively we engage in an act of argumentation. 
The authors are mostly focused on justifi cation and argumentation because 
they believe that to be the primary functions of reasons. This is also what 
the reason module is design to do. In order to better explain how intuitive 
inference works here is a simple example from The Enigma:
You arrive at the party and are pleased to see that your friend Molly is there 
too. She seems, however, to be upset. When you have a chance to talk to her, you 
say, “You seem to be upset tonight.” She replies, “I am not upset. Why do you say 
that?” Just as you had intuited that she was upset, you now intuit reasons for 
your initial intuition. Here are what your two intuitions
might be:
First order intuition: Molly is upset.
Metarepresentational intuition about your reasons for your fi rst order intuition: 
the fact that Molly isn’t smiling and that her voice is strained is what gives me 
reasons to believe that she is upset. (136–137)
In this example we see how intuitive inference works. Intuitive inference 
operates on two distinct levels: the fi rst order intuitive inference and the in-
tuitive inference of higher order—about reasons for the fi rst order intuition. 
This two levels of inference operate simultaneously. The authors proceed by 
explaining how the reason module operates under normal circumstances.
Firstly, the authors claim, that the intuitions the reason module provides 
are not about facts that could be a reason for some unspecifi ed conclusion. 
Example: “That Amy has a fever is a reason”. The reason module provides 
intuitions which are about facts taken together with the conclusion that they 
support. Example: “That Amy has a fever is a reason to call the doctor”.
 Book Reviews 379
Secondly, they claim that in reasoning the output of the reason module 
is a higher-order conclusion that there are reasons for a lower-order conclu-
sion. Which means that the reason module produces two new conclusions, 
the second conclusion embedded in the fi rst. The fi rst conclusion is the high-
er-order argument itself, in other words the metarepresentational intuition 
that certain reasons support a particular conclusion. Example: “Amy’s fever 
is a good reason to call the doctor now.” The second conclusion is the con-
clusion: Let’s call the doctor!, which is embedded in the overall argument 
and supported by it. The authors call this entire concept the intuitive ar-
gument. The intuitive argument is a main function of the reason module. 
The secondary function of a reason module is the refl ective conclusion. The 
refl ective conclusion is a conclusion accepted because of higher-order think-
ing or refl ecting about it. The authors claim that most of our inferences are 
more intuitive than refl ective. Even after they explain how humans reason 
under normal circumstances there seems that something is missing from 
their account. The thing that is missing is logic. Mercier and Sperber are 
very strict here. In reasoning logic is nothing more than a heuristic tool. The 
authors argue, using Sherlock Holmes as their puppet, that if an argument 
is valid we generally have no reason to accept it. If an argument is valid and 
sound, we still generally have no reason to accept it. Only when we have 
independent reasons which are relevant for us should we accept the argu-
ment presented to us. Mercier and Sperber conclude that reasoning is not 
the use of logic (or of any similar formal system) to derive conclusions.  Now 
the question arises: for what purpose do we use our reason? The authors 
reject the standard view that we use reason to attain knowledge and make 
better decisions. They call this view the intellectualist approach. Because 
this approach fails to explain how humans reason Mercier and Sperber take 
a different approach, which they call the interactionist approach. So, we use 
our reason when we are trying to convince others or when others are trying 
to convince us. The production of arguments proceeds by means of back-
ward inference, from a favored conclusion to reasons that would support it. 
This function together with mindreading enables us to trust each other and 
cooperate in a way no other living creature is capable of. But aren’t we at 
risk of being deceived by others? Mercier and Sperber claim that the concept 
of epistemic vigilance is what keeps us from falling into that trap.
In chapter four, What reason can and cannot, Mercier and Sperber con-
tinue with their argumentation. They begin by tackling the notion of confor-
mation bias. They concede that the conformation bias exists, as almost all 
empirical research confi rms this. But they claim that this is nothing to be 
worried about. The conformation bias is not a bug or a stain in our reason-
ing, it is actually a feature of our reason. How does the conformation bias as 
a feature of reason work? Well, the primary function of reason is to convince 
others and evaluate them when they are trying to convince us. In that sense 
it is very reasonable to have a conformation bias. Because we enter into 
this kinds of argumentative processes on a daily basis the authors rename 
the conformation bias as the myside bias. Mercier and Sperber continue 
by stating that there are two faces of reason. One face is the production of 
reasons and the other face is the evaluation of other’s reasons. This relation 
is, of course, asymmetrical. In everyday communication we demand honest 
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answers from others, but we rarely give honest answers ourselves. Most 
of the time we, more or less subtly, shape our answers to appear better in 
other people’s eyes. The same asymmetry is employed when we produce and 
evaluate other’s reasons. When we produce reasons we are mostly biased for 
our side and the quality control for our reasons is very poor. On the other 
hand, when we evaluate other’s reasons we are unbiased, we are willing to 
accept only those reasons which are strong enough and quality control for 
other people’s reasons is very high. This naturally leads to the fi nal segment 
of Mercier and Sperber’s argumentation—working in groups. Firstly, em-
pirical evidence points into direction that working in groups produces better 
results than working individually. In two studies (Moshman, Moshman and 
Geil) students were presented with Wason’s selection task, fi rst individu-
ally then in groups. Individually the students reached a performance of 15% 
of correct answers and in groups they reached 50% and 80 % respectively. 
Secondly, working better in groups seems to make theoretical sense as well. 
If reason is a specifi c module designed to produce and evaluate reasons, 
then it is the case that we need each other to reason properly or at least to 
reason better.
In their fi fth and fi nal chapter, Reason in the wild, Mercier and Sperber 
are answering three general questions which can be seen as a possible criti-
cism of their stance.6 The fi rst question is: is human reason universal? Here, 
the authors are preemptively reacting to the possibility of their account 
of human reasoning being WEIRD. The acronym stands for people from 
Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic countries. Mercier 
and Sperber conclude that this is not the case. Argumentation can emerge 
in quite different ways in different cultures but the core of human reasoning 
stays more or less the same. Empirical evidence shows that very small chil-
dren are sensitive to argumentation across cultures. The second question is: 
how do we reason about moral and political topics? Here, the authors argue 
that most moral and political advancements in history are the product of 
argumentation. And the third question is: what about solitary geniuses? 
Mercier and Sperber concede that solitary geniuses exists, but that they are 
rare and mostly present in rigid fi elds, like mathematics and logic, in which 
you can essentially argue with yourself.
Now we should notice some possible points of issue in Mercier and Sper-
ber’s argumentation. Firstly, it could be proposed that there should be a 
stronger connection between human inference and the objective state of af-
fairs in the world. On Mercier and Sperber’s account we arrive at the truth 
almost by accident when we reason with each other. Secondly, the defl ation 
of logic in answering the question how do we reason leaves a huge explana-
tory gap. In other words, if logic is not the structure of how we reason, then 
what exactly is logic? The authors are not necessarily obliged to answer this 
question but this question is one of the outcomes of their account of reason-
ing. Lastly, argumentation in Mercier and Sperber view is itself defl ated to 
everyday communication between people which in turn presents a serious 
challenge to the normative aspect of reasoning.
The Enigma of Reason is overall a well written and structurally a pre-
cise book. The argumentation is methodically carried out through all of the 
6 These questions are also subchapters of the fi nal chapter Reason in the wild.
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chapters and the authors are arguing their case extremely well and because 
of that The Enigma of Reason is a book worth reading whether you agree or 
disagree with the arguments presented there.7
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